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FOURTH AMENDMENT-WARRANTLESS
SEARCH OF PACKAGES SEIZED
FROM AN AUTOMOBILE
United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985).
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Johns, I the Supreme Court held that the war-
rantless search of packages which were lawfully seized in a valid au-
tomobile search and stored in a Drug Enforcement Administration
warehouse for three days did not violate the warrant requirement of
the fourth amendment.2 The Court's holding broadens the excep-
tion to the fourth amendment warrant requirement for the search of
packages that was set out in United States v. Ross.3 In Ross, the Court
held that the search of packages4 found in the course of a valid auto-
mobile search would not require a warrant where the police had rea-
son to believe that the packages concealed the object of the
probable cause search.
The Ross decision was grounded in the practical considerations
that justify the warrantless search of an automobile.5 The Court
reasoned that the exigent circumstances which have traditionally
justified the warrantless search of an automobile also justify the war-
rantless search of the packages found within the automobile, since
to hold otherwise would undermine the purpose of the automobile
1 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985).
2 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
3 456 U.S. 798 (1982). For a detailed review of the Ross decision, see infra notes 35-
40 and accompanying text.
4 In Ross, the Court referred to the object that was searched as a "container." In
Johns, the objects involved were described as "packages." Since no distinction between
these has been made by the Supreme Court, this note will generally use the word "pack-
ages" to refer to all sealed or dosed containers, bags, boxes, suitcases, etc.
5 Under the automobile exception, the police may search an automobile without a
warrant if they have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband.




exception. 6 By extending the Ross exception to the facts inJohns, the
Court has indicated that the warrantless search of packages found in
automobiles, like the warrantless search of automobiles themselves,
will not be deemed unreasonable merely because of a delay between
the seizure of the packages and their subsequent search.
7
This Note argues that the majority's reasoning in Johns was mis-
guided. The Court failed to adhere to a cardinal principle of fourth
amendment jurisprudence, namely, that there is a strong presump-
tion in favor of a warrant, and the few, well-delineated exceptions to
that requirement cannot be broader than necessary to satisfy the
reasons that gave rise to them.8 Because the warrantless search of
packages which were seized and secured three days previously was
not necessary to satisfy the practical considerations which justified
the Ross exception, 9 the search in Johns should have been declared
unreasonable.
In addition, this casenote will argue that theJohns Court failed
to recognize a basic distinction between the justifications for the au-
tomobile exception and those for the Ross exception for the warrant-
less search of packages. The automobile exception is based, in
large part, on a lesser expectation of privacy evidenced by the tradi-
tional treatment of vehicles under the fourth amendment. Such an
exception based on a lesser expectation of privacy is not determined
by whether or not a warrant can practicably be obtained. The Ross
exception, on the other hand, is largely based on exigent circum-
stances and practical considerations.10 This type of exception is
strictly limited by the practicability of getting a warrant. When ob-
taining a warrant becomes practicable, the type of exception recog-
6 Ross, 456 U.S. at 820, 821 n.28.
7 105 S. Ct. at 885-86. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
8 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
393, 405 (1970).
9 The Court in Ross desired to draw a bright line by which to guide law enforcement
officials and lower courts, 456 U.S. at 826 (Powell, J., concurring), and attempted to
advance the practical considerations involved in an automobile search which would be
defeated if packages found in the vehicle could not be searched without a warrant inci-
dent to the automobile search. Id. at 820, 821 n.28.
10 Another example of an exception to the warrant clause which is based on exigent
circumstances and practical considerations is the "search incident to arrest" exception.
This exception allows the police to search without a warrant the immediate area in con-
trol of the arrestee at the time of the arrest. This exception is justified by the necessity
of allowing the police to search for and seize valuable evidence before the arrestee can
destroy it, or to search for and seize any weapons which the arrestee might gain posses-
sion of and use against the arresting officers. For a general review of the several recog-
nized exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement, see 2 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.1(a) (1978).
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nized in Ross is diffused, whereas the justification for the automobile
exception remains intact.
This Note will argue that in the context of an immediate prob-
able cause search upon seizure, the rule developed in Ross is justi-
fied. In the absence of the exigent circumstances created by the
location of a package in an automobile, however, the Ross exception
for the warrantless search of packages is unjustified. Therefore,
Johns overextends the Ross exception by deviating from fundamental
fourth amendment principles and relying on an unfounded analogy.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
To broaden the scope of permissible police activities at the ex-
pense of constitutional protection requires substantial justification.
Such a justification in the instant case could only be sustained by
demonstrating that the theoretical underpinnings for the automo-
bile exception can be logically fused with the rationale for a warrant-
less package search. Because of the historically different bases for
the two exceptions, however, this link cannot be made. The Court
in Johns improperly extended an exception to the warrant require-
ment and further eroded fourth amendment protections. To
demonstrate that this is the case, consideration of the fourth amend-
ment and its several exceptions is necessary.
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT BACKGROUND
The fourth amendment applies wherever a person has a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the house, paper, or effect that has
been seized or searched. 1" In Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan
separated the expectation of privacy that is necessary to trigger
fourth amendment protections into two parts: the person must have
an actual subjective expectation of privacy, and the subjective ex-
pectation of privacy must be one that society is prepared to recog-
nize as reasonable. 12
Where this subjective expectation of privacy is recognized as
reasonable, the fourth amendment creates a strong presumption in
11 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 129 (1978) (Petitioners failed to show that they had
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or the area under the seat
of the automobile in which they were riding as passengers.); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (The government's eavesdropping activities violated the privacy
upon which the petitioner justifiably relied while using a telephone booth.).
12 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The second component is virtually




favor of requiring a warrant for a search or seizure.13 The Court,
however, has created a few well-delineated exceptions to the war-
rant requirement.' 4 In order to uphold the presumption in favor of
warrants, these exceptions are no broader than necessary to satisfy
the reasons that justify them.15 This limit on the scope of excep-
tions is especially binding when the exception allows a search of a
place or thing that is normally protected by the warrant require-
ment. 16 This point is illustrated by cases in which the Supreme
Court rejected warrantless searches under an exception that would
have made them initially permissible, because the searches were
delayed for a sufficient time to make it practical to obtain a
13 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). "[I]t is a cardinal principle that
'searches conducted outside the judicial process without prior approval by a judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment - subject to only a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 390 (1978)(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357).
The warrant requirement is deemed crucial to protecting fourth amendment rights
because of the importance of having the probable cause determination made by a neu-
tral and detached magistrate. The warrant requirement provides a number of protec-
tions that apost hocjudicial evaluation of a police officer's probable cause does not. Ross,
456 U.S. at 830 (1982)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
Prior review by a detached and neutral magistrate limits the concentration of power
by executive officers, and prevents overbroad and unjustified searches from occurring.
See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972); Abil v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217, 252 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Prior review may also "prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the rea-
sonableness of a search or seizure." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565
(1976). See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). Furthermore, even if the police
conduct a search that a magistrate would have authorized, the imposition of prior judi-
cial review reassures the public that the process of law has been orderly. Ross, 456 U.S.
at 830 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,410-11
(1974).
14 Amsterdam puts the exceptions into three categories: "consent searches, a very
limited class of routine searches (for example, border searches or the (inventory) search
of impounded vehicles), and certain searches conducted under circumstances of haste
that render the obtaining of a search warrant impracticable." Amsterdam, supra note 13,
at 358. See also supra notes 5, 10 and accompanying text and infra note 22 and accompa-
nying text.
15 See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981)(majority opinion)("[t]he
scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible")(quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762
(1962)); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 405 (1978)("warrantless searches must
be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation,' ") (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967)).
16 Typically, these exceptions are allowed because the immediate objective require-
ments of the situation make it impracticable to get a warrant. See United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. at 318 (rejecting government's argument that the special
circumstances applicable to domestic security surveillances necessitate a further excep-
tion to the warrant requirement).
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warrant.17
For example, the Court has permitted an arresting officer to
make a warrantless search of an item, including a package, that is
within an arrestee's immediate control.' 8 In United States v. Chad-
wick,' 9 however, the Court held that the search incident to arrest
exception did not apply to the search of a footlocker which had been
taken out of the arrestee's immediate area and searched after it had
been stored at a government warehouse for an hour. The Court,
declining to extend the exception beyond the justifications that gave
rise to it, noted that since the arrestee could not gain access to the
secured footlocker to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, the police
could practicably obtain a warrant and were thus required to do
S0.20
Similarly, in Michigan v. Tyler,21 the Court permitted investiga-
tors to make an immediate warrantless entry into a building after a
fire had been extinguished,22 but held that the investigators needed
a warrant to re-enter the building days later.23 As ChiefJustice Bur-
ger once explained, "An exigency which would have permitted an
immediate warrantless search of a building [does] not support a
warrantless search two days later when it would have been practica-
ble to get a warrant.
' '24
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT TREATMENT OF AUTOMOBILES AND PACKAGES
The fourth amendment warrant requirement does not apply to
automobiles. 25 In Carroll v. United States,26 the Court held that a war-
17 See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978)(once fire investigators had deter-
mined the cause of the fire, an additional search of the home could have only been for
the purpose of finding evidence of arson, and thus a criminal search warrant was re-
quired for re-entry); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)(warrantless search of
luggage or other property seized at the time of the arrest cannot be justified as incident
to that arrest if the search is remote in time or place from the arrest); GM Leasing Corp.
v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) (IRS agents' delay in making a warrantless entry
into petitioner's office to seize records evidenced no exigent circumstances, so a warrant
was required). Cf Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393-94; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
18 Chimel, 395 U.8. at 763. An immediate warrantless search is permissible because
there exists some danger that the arrestee may seize and destroy evidence in his immedi-
ate control or that he might gain possession of a weapon which could be used against
the arresting officer.
19 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
20 Id. at 15; see also Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964).
21 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
22 Warrantless entry is allowed in this circumstance to determine the cause of the fire
and to ensure that it does not reignite. Id. at 511.
23 Id.
24 GM Leasing Corp., 429 U.S. at 361 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
25 The Court has not extended the fourth amendment to automobiles because of a
unique historical footnote associated with the passage of that amendment. The same
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rantless search of an automobile by police officers who had probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband was not un-
reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
27
Generally, two justifications have been articulated for removing
the automobile from the purview of the fourth amendment. First,
the exigency created by the mobility of an automobile makes ob-
taining a warrant impracticable. 28 Second, an individual's dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in an automobile makes a warrantless
search based on probable cause reasonable. 29 The Court in recent
years has invoked this second justification even in cases where there
was no possibility that the automobile would be moved.30 For ex-
ample, the Court found that this diminished expectation of privacy
justified the search of an automobile which was in police control for
hours, or even days, after the lawful warrantless seizure of the vehi-
cle.31 Since a warrant is virtually never required to search an auto-
Congress that ratified the fourth amendment also enacted a statute that allowed the
warrantless search of ships, but not of homes. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150-51 (referring to
Act ofJuly 31, 1784, 1 Stat. 29, 43 etseq.). Since the same Congressmen who enacted the
fourth amendment did not extend the warrant requirement to the search of ships, the
functional predecessors of automobiles, the Court has reasoned that automobiles are
not guaranteed the protections of a warrant requirement. Id.
26 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
27 Id. In Carroll, the police officers had probable cause to believe that an automobile
contained contraband and was participating in a bootlegging scheme. The police
stopped the car and searched its interior by tearing open the upholstery of the seat
cushion. They discovered 68 bottles of gin and whiskey concealed inside the cushion
and arrested the driver. The Court held that the warrantless search of an automobile is
not unreasonable, but did not explicitly address the scope of the search that is
permissible.
28 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132. The
automobile's mobility would enable it to be removed from the jurisdiction by the time a
warrant could be procured. Or, if the police could warrantlessly seize the vehicle but
could not conduct an immediate search of it, they would often be faced with the problem
of detaining the unarrested occupants while a warrant is obtained.
29 The Supreme Court has determined that the intrusion of a warrantless search of
an automobile is constitutionally less significant than a warrantless search of more pri-
vate areas because an automobile presents much of its contents to plain view and is used
for travel subject to significant government regulation. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753 (1979).
30 See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261-62 (1982)(Once the inventory
search of the glove compartment of respondent's automobile at the police staion re-
vealed contraband, the warrantless search was properly expanded to include the air
vents without any showing of exigent circumstances.). This suggests that the Court per-
ceives this second factor, and not the factor of the automobile's mobility as the principle
justification for the automobile exception.
31 Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261-62 (warrantless inventory search of respondent's automo-
bile at the scene of the arrest prior to towing the automobile upheld); Texas v. White,
423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975)(per curiam); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 44.
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mobile, the practicability of obtaining a warrant in such cases is not
a relevant consideration.
Packages, on the other hand, have historically been treated dif-
ferently. Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court held that
the warrant clause applied to packages.3 2 The Chadwick decision re-
affirmed the general principle that dosed packages may not be
searched without a warrant,3 3 and the Court in Ross refused to draw
a distinction between packages which are "worthy" or "unworthy"
of this protection.3 4 From this universal recognition of the legiti-
mate expectaion of privacy in packages, it is clear that the practica-
bility of obtaining a warrant must become a significant factor in
determining the reasonableness of the search of packages.
C. UNITED STATES V. ROSS
In United States v. Ross,35 the Court allowed the warrantless
search of packages36 as part of a valid warrantless automobile search
since the police conducting the search could reasonably have be-
lieved that the packages contained the object of the search. 37 The
Court advanced two reasons to justify this exception to the normal
rule that packages cannot be searched without a warrant. First, the
Court reasoned that the police and lower courts needed a bright
line rule to know when a warrantless search is permissible and when
32 ExparteJackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878)("[S]ealed packages ... are.., fully guarded
from examination and inspection .... They can only be opened and examined under
... warrant .... "). Id. at 733.
33 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11 ("No less than one who locks the doors of his house
against intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner [placing
personal effects inside a footlocker] is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment
Warrant Clause.").
34 Ross, 456 U.S. at 822.
35 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
36 Again, "packages" is used here as a general term encompassing closed or sealed
packages or containers. See supra note 4.
37 456 U.S. at 825-26. In Ross, the police acted on an informant's tip that a described
individual was selling narcotics kept in the trunk of his car at a certain location. The
police went to that location, found the car and arrested the driver. The officers opened
the trunk and discovered a closed, brown paper bag. Without a warrant, the police
searched the bag and found glasine bags containing white powder which later proved to
be heroin. Another warrantless search of the trunk at the police station revealed a zip-
pered pouch containing cash. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of these
two warrantless package searches, but the Supreme Court held that the automobile ex-
ception to the warrant requirement permits the warrantless search of the contents of a
container found in a vehicle search conducted upon probable cause, provided that the
container is one that might reasonably contain the object of the search. 456 U.S. at 810-
14. "If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the
search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search." Id. at 825.
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it is not.38 Second, the Court noted that the practical consideration
justifying the automobile exception - namely, the exigency created
by the mobility of the automobile - would be undermined if the
packages found inside the automobile could not be searched as part
of the automobile search.3 9 In light of these practical considera-
tions, the Court in Ross held that the scope of the warrantless search
authorized by the automobile exception is no broader or narrower
than that which a magistrate could authorize by a warrant.
40
Although the Ross majority acknowledged that packages nor-
mally cannot be searched without a warrant, it created this excep-
tion in recognition of the exigency created by the circumstances of
the automobile search. The Court in Ross, however, never intimated
that it was extending the complete scope of the automobile excep-
tion to packages found in automobiles.
III. UNITED STATES V. JOHNS
A. FACTS
On August 4, 1981, while conducting an investigation of a sus-
pected drug smuggling operation, a United States Customs officer
saw two pickup trucks drive away from respondent Duarte's resi-
dence in Tucson, Arizona.4 1 The Customs officer contacted other
officers who subsequently conducted air and ground surveillance of
38 456 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court referred to this area of the
law encompassing exceptions to the warrant requirement as "this troubled area." Id. at
825.
39 The Court suggested that if a package found in the course of an automobile search
could not be opened without a warrant, then the warrantless search of the automobile
would be delayed until a warrant for the search of the package was obtained. The police
could never be certain, until the package was opened, that the object of their search was
not concealed in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle. The ensuing vehicle search
would inevitably become excessively intrusive since the police would search every inch
of the vehicle before obtaining a warrant to search the package. The Court stated that
this result would be directly inconsistent with the Carroll rationale. 456 U.S. at 820, 822
n.28. Furthermore, the practical problem of whether to detain or release a vehicle's
unarrested occupants would be exacerbated if the police had to delay the completion of
the vehicle search to obtain a warrant to search a package found within the vehicle.
40 Id. at 822.
41 At approximately 1:30 a.m., a Customs officer received a report from an unidenti-
fied informant of suspicious activity at the Tucson Dragway. The informant stated that
an airplane had landed at the dragway and had been met by a car. At the request of
Customs officials, the county sheriff's department intercepted the car as it was leaving
the scene. The police detected no criminal activity, so they allowed the driver and his
passenger, later identified as respondents Johns and Hearron, to proceed on their way.
Previously, Customs officers had information linking respondentJohns with respondent
Duarte in an international drug smuggling operation. Based on this information, Cus-
toms officers initiated surveillance at Duarte's residence. United States v.Johns, No. CR
81-188 (D. Ariz.Jan. 8, 1982) (memorandum decision and order), reprinted in Petition for
940 [Vol. 76
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the trucks.42 The trucks traveled 100 miles to a remote private air-
strip near Bowie, Arizona, approximately 50 miles from the Mexican
border.43 Soon after the trucks arrived at the airstrip, a small plane
landed. 44 Customs officers in the air saw one of the trucks approach
the plane and relayed this information to the officers on the ground
who were unable to see what had transpired.45 Shortly threreafter,
the aircraft departed.46 A second small aircraft then landed and de-
parted in the same fashion.
47
The two Customs officers on the ground approached to investi-
gate, parking their vehicles about 30 yards from the trucks.48 As the
officers approached the trucks, one saw an individual covering the
contents in the rear of the truck with a blanket.49 Both officers
smelled marijuana and ordered the respondents to come out from
behind the trucks and to lie on the ground.50
In the backs of the trucks, the officers saw packages wrapped in
dark green plastic and sealed with tape.5 1 The officers arrested at
the scene the respondent Duarte and the other four men involved in
the transaction. 52 The other officers who were conducting the air
surveillance followed the pilots of the planes, respondents Hearron
and Johns, back to Tucson and arrested them upon landing.
The Customs officers did not search the pickup trucks or the
packages at the airstrip but, rather, took the trucks back to the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) headquarters in Tucson. There
the packages53 were removed from the trucks and placed in the DEA
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Appendix
at 16,Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985).






48 Id. at 20.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 One of the officers testified, based on his experience, that smuggled marijuana is
commonly packaged in this manner. 105 S. Ct. at 883.
52 Before leaving the scene, the officers noticed some loose vegetable matter on the
ground that they believed to be marijuana. United States v. Johns, No. CR 81-188 (I.
Ariz. Jan. 8, 1982)(memorandum decision and order), reprinted in Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Appendix at 22,
Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985).
53 There were approximately 40 packages. The packages were of two types - some
were cardboard boxes wrapped in heavy double-ply green garbage bags which were
taped with heavy masking tape, and the others were in two thicknesses of heavy bags
taped with masking tape. United States v. Johns, No. CR 81-188 (D. Ariz. Jan. 8,
1982)(memorandum decision and order), reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
1985]
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warehouse. Three days later,54 DEA agents opened some of the
packages without first obtaining a search warrant and took samples
that later proved to be marijuana.
On September 1, 1981, a federal grand jury for the District of
Arizona indicted the seven respondents for conspiracy to possess
marijuana and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.55
Before trial, the motion to suppress the marijuana as evidence was
granted.56 The government appealed.
57
A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that the officers were required
to obtain a warrant to search the packages because there was a delay
of three days between the seizure of the trucks and the subsequent
search of the packages found within the trucks.58 The court of ap-
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Appendix at 2, 19-20,Johns,
105 S. Ct. 881 (1985).
54 Although the record leaves unclear precisely when the agents opened the pack-
ages, the parties did not dispute the conclusion of the court of appeals that the search
occurred three days after the packages were seized. 105 S. Ct. at 882.
55 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1981)(making it illegal for any person to knowingly
possess marijuana with intent to distribute it, and to conspire to possess marijuana with
intent to distribute it).
56 The district court's memorandum of decision and order is unreported, but is re-
printed in the appendix of the petition for certiorari. The district court relied on Rob-
bins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) to hold that the insubstantial nature of the
packages involved did not justify dispensing with a warrant. United States v. Johns, No.
CR 81-188 (D. Ariz.Jan. 8, 1982)(memorandum decision and order), reprinted in Petition
for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Ap-
pendix at 23-27,Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985). The district court also refused to apply the
automobile exception on the ground that "[t]he defendants were arrested and the con-
traband secured at the DEA warehouse" before the search of the packages was carried
out. Id. at 24. The district court similarly declined to recognize a "plain odor" exception
to the warrant requirement. Id. Finally, the court found the evidence insufficient to
establish that the plastic wrapped packages "could have only contained marijuana." Id.
at 27-28. This last finding refuted the government's argument that the warrantless
search in this case was not unreasonable because the shape and characteristics of the
packages disclosed their contents, thus eliminating respondents' reasonable expectation
of privacy in them. The district court recognized this "plain view" exception as legiti-
mate, see Robbins, 453 U.S. at 427-28, but refused to extend the exception to the facts
before it.
57 While this case was pending on appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), which overruled Robbins. See supra notes 37
& 56.
58 United States v. Johns, 707 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1983). In affirming the suppres-
sion order, the court of appeals concluded that Ross could be applied retroactively be-
cause Ross established a lawful search method, and thus, no legitimate reliance interest
could be undercut by the Ross holding. 707 F.2d at 1096. The court also concluded that
since the focus of the officer's suspicion was not exclusively on the packages but in-
cluded the vehicles themselves, Ross was applicable. Thus, the court concluded that the
packages could have been searched without a warrant as a part of the search of the
trucks. Id. at 1098. However, the court held that because of the time lapse between the
seizure of the packages and the subsequent search, taking samples from the packages
[Vol. 76942
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peals held that a warrant was necessary since the officers had held
the packages long enough to obtain a warrant. The Court also re-
jected the government's contentions that the plain odor of the mari-
juana emanating from the packages made a warrant unnecessary59
and that respondents Johns and Hearron lacked standing to chal-
lenge the search of the packages.60 Most importantly, the court of
appeals held that Ross did not authorize the warrantless search of
the packages three days after they were removed from the pickup
trucks and stored in the DEA warehouse. 61 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the suppression order.
B. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
1. The Majority
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Ross
authorizes a warrantless search of packages several days after they
are removed from vehicles that police officers had probable cause to
believe contained contraband. 62 Justice O'Connor wrote for the
seven-member majority.63 Justice O'Connor wrote that inasmuch as
without a warrant was unlawful. Id. at 1099. To reach that conclusion, the court relied
on those cases holding that the search incident to arrest doctrine does not permit a
warrantless search of property seized from an arrested subject if that search is conducted
after the arrest is completed. Id. See also United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038 (9th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981). The Court
also relied on the fact that the Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52
(1970), limited the automobile exception of searches upon seizure to those conducted
"soon" after a seizure. Johns, 707 F.2d at 1099. Finally, the Court relied on the fact that
the officers could have easily obtained a warrant at any time and that neither basis for
the automobile exception-the impracticability of getting a warrant and the lesser ex-
pectation of privacy in automobiles-applied to packages secured for three days at a
government warehouse. Id.
59 Id. at 1095-96. Essentially, the court of appeals agreed with the disrict court's
rejection of the "plain view" exception. See supra note 56.
60 Id. at 1099-1100. The government claimed that Johns and Hearron lacked stand-
ing to question the validity of the search since they had departed a few minutes before
the seizures of the packages at the airstrip. The court of appeals found that the pilots'
interests in the packages were indistinguishable from those of the other defendants and
that the pilots therefore had standing. The court found that Johns and Hearron met
their burden of showing a reasonable expectation of privacy based on their formalized
bailor/bailee relationship to the other five defendants. Id.
61 Id. at 1097-99. The court emphasized that Ross did not overrule United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that placing a package in an automobile does not
destroy the expectation of privacy in the package). The court stated, "[W]hile Ross holds
that the officers could have searched the packages, either on the spot or shortly thereaf-
ter, the automobile exception does not allow the warrantless search of containers seized
and secured by the police for three days before the search. The rationale for the auto-
mobile exception no longer applies." Id. at 1100.
62 United States v. Johns, 104 S. Ct. 3532 (1984) (granting petition for certiorari).
63 Justice O'Connor was joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Pow-
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the Ross exception entitled the government to seize the packages
and search them immediately without a warrant, the warrantless
search three days after the packages were stored in the DEA ware-
house was reasonable and consistent with precedent involving
delayed searches of impounded automobiles. 64 In reversing the de-
cision of the court of appeals, the Court relied on United States v.
Ross,65 and other cases extending the automobile exception, and
distinguished United States v. Chadwick,66 one of the cases suggesting
that a warrant is required for the search of packages.
Before Justice O'Connor addressed the issue of the delay, she
disposed of two of the respondents' arguments. First, Justice
O'Connor acknowledged the respondents' claim that the suppres-
sion of the marijuana should be affirmed because the Customs of-
ficers never had probable cause to conduct a vehicle search, and
therefore, Chadwick, and not Ross, was applicable. The Court re-
jected this argument, concluding that the officers had probable
cause to believe that not only the packages, but the vehicles them-
selves contained contraband.67 It was this probable cause, accord-
ing to the Court, that distinguished Chadwick and made Ross
applicable. 68
ell, Stevens, Rehnquist and White. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Marshall joined.
64 See Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, (1984)(per curiam); Michigan v. Thomas,
458 U.S. 259 (1982)(per curiam); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967)(upholding a
warrantless search of an automobile that took place seven days after the seizure of the
automobile).
65 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
66 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In Chadwick, police officers had probable cause to believe that a
footlocker contained contraband. The officers seized the footlocker as soon as it was
placed in the trunk of an automobile and then searched its contents without a warrant.
The Court refused to hold that probable cause generally supports the warrantless search
of luggage, and did not extend the automobile exception to the search of the footlocker
simply because the footlocker was located in an automobile when it was seized. The
Court deemed the search unreasonable. Id. at 11.
67 105 S. Ct. at 884. The Court cited various factors which supported the officers'
probable cause belief that the vehicles themselves contained contraband, namely: 1) the
events involved indicated that these trucks were being used in smuggling activity; 2) the
officers on the ground were unable to see what transpired between the aircraft and the
trucks; and 3) the smell of marijuana emanated from the area around the trucks.
68 The Court pointed out that Ross did not overrrule Chadwick. 105 S. Ct. at 885.
The distinction lies in the basis of the probable cause. The Chadwick Court recognized
that where the police have probable cause to believe a container contains contraband
and that container's contact with an automobile is merely incidental, the automobile
exception does not extend to allow the warrantless search of the container. Chadwick,
433 U.S. at 15. See also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)(holding that warrant-
less search of luggage was unreasonable where police waited for the luggage to be
placed in automobile's trunk before they seized it). However, where the police have
probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband, Ross allows the warrantless
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Justice O'Connor next addressed the respondents' claim that
no vehicle search had occurred. The Court disposed of this argu-
ment as "meritless," concluding that the Customs officers had con-
ducted a vehicle search at least to the extent of removing the
packages from the trucks.
69
Justice O'Connor then analyzed the central issue of the case.
The Justice began by explaining the rationale and significance of
Ross.70 In Ross, the Court drew on the original description set out in
Carroll v. United States71 of the scope of warrantless searches pursuant
to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.72 From
the Court's conclusion in Ross that "if probable cause justifies the
search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every
part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of
the search,"' 73 Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Customs officers
could have lawfully searched the packages when they were first dis-
covered at the airstrip. 74
The Court then compared the delay between the seizure of the
packages and their subsequent warrantless search in Johns to cases in
which the Court allowed the warrantless searches of automobiles
a significant time after police lawfully seized them.75 Justice
O'Connor noted that there is no requirement that the warrantless
search of a vehicle occur contemporaneously with its lawful seizure
because "the justification to conduct such a warrantless search does
not vanish once the car has been immobilized."
76
search of all containers within the vehicle which could reasonably conceal the object of
the search. Ross, 456 U.S. at 826.
69 105 S. Ct. at 885.
70 Id. at 885-87.
71 267 U.S. 132 (1925). "[T]hose lawfully within the country, entitled to use the
public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there
is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that
their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise." Id. at 153-54. "[A]s we
have seen, good faith is not enough to constitute probable cause. That faith must be
grounded on facts within knowledge of the (officer), which in the judgment of the court
would make his faith reasonable." Id. at 161-62 (quoting Director General of Railroads
v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 (1923)).
72 The Court in Ross held that the scope of the warrantless search authorized by the
exception recognized in Carroll is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could
legitimately authorize by warrant. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
73 Id.
74 105 S. Ct. at 885.
75 See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 42 (up-
holding a warrantless search at the police station of a seized automobile).
76 105 S. Ct. at 885 (quoting Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982)). Essentially,
these delayed car search cases hold that a vehicle lawfully in police custody may be
searched without a warrant on the basis of probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contains contraband, even when exigent circumstances otherwise justifying the war-
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Although the court of appeals read Ross only to allow warrant-
less searches of packages if the search occurs "immediately" as a
part of the vehicle inspection or "soon thereafer", 77 Justice
O'Connor emphasized that neither Ross nor the delayed car search
cases78 suggest any such limitation. 79 Justice O'Connor wrote that
Ross indicated that the test for the legality of the package search was
whether the exception to the warrant requirement recognized by
Carroll was applicable, and not whether exigent circumstances ex-
isted.8 0 Summarily, the Court held that "the fact that a [package] is
involved does not in itself either expand or contract the well-estab-
lished exception to the warrant requirement recognized by
Carroll."8
1
Justice O'Connor also pointed out that the practical effect of
the lower court's decisions would only be to direct police to search
all containers and packages that they discover in the course of a ve-
hicle search immediately upon discovery. Since this result would be
of little benefit to the person whose property is being searched, Jus-
tice O'Connor reasoned, then the delay in the execution of the war-
rantless search are absent. See also Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852 (1984) (per
curiam)(warrantless search of an automobile eight hours after its seizure upheld as
reasonable).
77 707 F.2d at 1099.
78 See supra notes 75 & 76. In Ross, the Court characterized Chambers as holding that if
an immediate search on the street is permissible without a warrant, then "a search soon
thereafter at the police station is permitted if the vehicle is impounded." Ross, 456 U.S.
at 807 n.9 (emphasis added). InJohns, the Court chose to interpret this possible time
limit on the Ross exception as not subjecting the packages found in the course of a vehi-
cle search to restrictions not applicable to the vehicle search itself. 105 S. Ct. at 886.
79 In fact, Ross involved the search of two containers. The Court there did not distin-
guish between the search of the paper bag that occurred at the scene of the arrest and
the search of the leather pouch later conducted at the police station.
80 105 S. Ct. at 886. The Court showed a bias toward the "lesser expectation of
privacy" justification for the automobile exception and practically ignored the "exi-
gency" justification. The Ross decision extended the automobile exception to packages
found in the automobile because they presented the same exigency when being trans-
ported in the vehicle as the automobile itself presented. The Court in Johns apparently
extended the exception to packages seized and secured by the police by extending the
"lesser expectation of privacy" rationale. Yet, because Ross stated that it did not over-
rule Chadwick, which held that a person's privacy expectation in a package was not dimin-
ished by placing it in a vehicle, the exigent circumstances justification must be the only
rationale for extending the automobile exception to packages. Because no exigency ex-
isted in Johns, the Court's extension of Ross has no doctrinal support. See infra note 83.
81 The majority then criticized the approach of the court of appeals for failing to
further any fourth amendment privacy interests. Citing United States v. Haley, 669 F.2d
201 (4th Cir. 1979)("plain odor" may justify a warrantless search), the Court suggested
that the respondents may not have possessed any privacy interest in the packages. The
Court concluded that any expectation of privacy in the vehicles or their contents was
subject to the authority of the officers to conduct a warrantless search based on probable
cause. 105 S. Ct. at 886-87.
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rantless search is not unreasonable.8 2
Thus, the majority in Johns expanded the scope of Ross by rea-
soning that because a delay between the lawful warrantless search of
an automobile and the subsequent warrantless search of that auto-
mobile does not take that search out of the scope of the automobile
exception, and because Ross applied the automobile exception to
permit the warrantless search of packages found in a vehicle in the
course of a valid search, then the warrantless search after the delay
between the seizure of those packages and their subsequent search
is not unreasonable.83
2. The Dissent
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, took a
broader view of the issue presented by Johns.8 4 Generally, Justice
Brennan emphasized that exceptions to the fourth amendment war-
rant requirement can only extend to cases where their justifications
mandate the exception. Brennan concluded that no justification
mandated extending the exception to the facts in Johns.
Specifically, the dissent noted that the fourth amendment pros-
cribes the warrantless search of closed packages,8 5 and that the
fourth amendment permits no more than "seizure of the property,
pending issuance of a warrant to examine its contents, if the exigen-
cies of the situation demand it .... 86 Justice Brennan went on to
assert that the location of a package in a vehicle does not provide a
reason to depart from this general rule.8 7 In effect, Justice Brennan
simply reiterated inJohns the reasoning of the dissent in Ross, and
concluded that afortiori, a warrantless search of a package three days
82 Id. at 887. The Court warned, however, that the police may not indefinitely retain
possession of a vehicle and its contents before they complete a vehicle search and cau-
tioned that the owner might attempt to prove that the delay was unreasonable as ad-
versely affecting a privacy or possessory interest.
83 Id. The Court did not recognize that each of its premises had different justifica-
tions, none of which is applicable to the search in Johns. First, the station house vehicle
searches are justified by the lesser expectaion of privacy in automobiles. Chadwick, how-
ever, stated that this lesser expectation does not extend to packages. Second, the Ross
exception is justified by exigent circumstances and practical considerations. However,
with the packages seized and secured in the DEA warehouse in Johns, no such exigencies
were present.
84 Justice Marshall,joined by justice Brennan, dissented in United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982).
85 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 10-11.
86 105 S. Ct. at 888 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 701 (1983)).
87 105 S. Ct. at 888 (Brennan,J., dissenting)(citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 830 (MarshallJ.,
dissenting))("The traditional reasoning for the automobile exception plainly does not
support extending it to the search of a container found inside a vehicle.").
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after its seizure violates the fourth amendment.88
The dissent addressed the central issue presented, the delay
before the warrantless search. The dissent rejected the majority's
"extension of the temporal scope of a permissible search" by an
analogy to the delayed car search cases.8 9 Without delineating his
reasoning, Justice Brennan flatly stated that "there is simply no jus-
tification for departing from the fourth amendment warrant require-
ment under the circumstances of this case; no exigency precluded
reasonable efforts to obtain a warrant prior to the search of the
packages in the warehouse." 90 Justices Brennan and Marshall there-
fore urged affirmance of the Ninth Circuit's decision.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Johns, the majority failed to adhere to the principle that the
Ross exception to the warrant clause, like other exceptions thereto,
should be "strictly limited by the exigencies which justify its initia-
tion."91 A review of the justifications for the Ross exception indi-
cates that the Court exceeded the boundaries of these justifications
in Johns.
First, the Ross Court claimed its exception was necessary to pre-
vent the automobile exception from being undermined. 92 However,
the purpose behind the automobile exception would not have been
undercut by requiring the Customs officers in Johns to obtain a war-
rant in the three-day interim between the seizure and the search of
the packages. The search of the pickup trucks, and the investigation
as a whole, would have been neither impeded nor delayed by requir-
ing a warrant for the search of the packages once they were secured
88 105 S. Ct. at 888 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89 Id. See Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975)(per curiam)(holding that where police
officers had probable cause to search respondent's car at the scene immediately after
arresting him, such probable cause still obtained shortly thereafter so that the officers
could constitutionally search the automobile at the station house without a warrant);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented in
White and questioned the reasoning of these decisions in South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364 (1976). In Opperman, the Court held that the routine inventory search of
the defendant's locked automobile, which had been lawfully impounded for multiple
parking violations, was not unreasonable. Id.
90 105 S. Ct. at 888 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also chided the majority
for introducing the "plain odor" issue in Johns, see supra note 81, because that issue had
not been presented to the Court.
91 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
25-26 (1967)). See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1962); United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977); GM Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338,
361 (1977)(Burger, C.J., concurring).
92 Ross, 456 U.S. at 820, 821 n.28. See supra note 9.
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by the officials.93 Also, the practical considerations supporting the
automobile exception do not support an exception for packages
which are completely within the police's control. 94 In short, once
the officials seized the packages and safely stored them in the DEA
warehouse, the practical considerations which justified the warrant-
less search in Ross no longer applied, and the authorities faced no
problems of impracticability in obtaining a warrant.
Second, the Ross exception was further justified because it cre-
ated a bright line to guide law enforcement officials and lower
courts. 95 Any bright line, however, should not stray far from the
cardinal principle of fourth amendment jurisprudence - that there
is a strong presumption in favor of warrants. 96 The Johns majority
not only side-stepped this cardinal principle, but it also diminished
the brightness of Ross' bright line. Although the Court did write
that officials may not indefinitely retain possession of a vehicle and
its contents before they complete the vehicle search,97 it gave no
further direction. In Johns, the Court allowed a three-day delay
93 This is so because the focus of the Custom officer's investigation from the start
was more on the packages than on the trucks, despite the Court's assertion that the
officers could have reasonably believed that the trucks themselves contained contra-
band.
In Chadwick, the Court held that since the focus of the officer's investigation was on
the footlocker, the footlocker's location in the automobile was merely incidental, and
thus a search of the footlocker could only be conducted upon issuance of a warrant.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 at 15-16. In Ross, the Court held that the police officers could
search a package found during a valid automobile search without a warrant if the pack-
ages could conceal the object of the search. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825. In this instance, the
focus of the investigation was on the automobile. The warrantless search of the pack-
ages was allowed merely to avoid undermining the practical considerations behind the
automobile exception.
In Johns, the Customs officers' investigation seemed to be focused on the packages.
The trucks were not searched at the airstrip and were only searched at the warehouse
"to the extent of entering the trucks and removing the packages." 105 S. Ct. at 885
(emphasis supplied). However, the Court characterized the respondents' contention
that the record failed to show that any vehicle search ever in fact occurred as "merit-
less." Id. Furthermore, the Court held that Ross, and not Chadwick, applied here because
the "officers had probable cause to believe that not only the packages, but the vehicles
themselves conained contraband." Id. In essence, the Court applied Ross and distin-
guished Chadwick based on what the officers could have believed, not on what they actu-
ally believed as objectively evidenced by their actions.
94 See supra notes 56-87 and accompanying text. Once the seized packages are in the
police's control, they cannot be removed from the jursidiction before a warrant is
obtained.
95 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
96 "It is a first principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not
conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable
cause to do so." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981). See also Mincey, 437
U.S. at 393.
97 105 S. Ct. at 887.
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before the warrantless search of a package after authorities seized it
during a valid automobile search. The question remains whether
this search would still be reasonable after a thirty-day delay - or a
300-day delay. The Court seemed to leave itself, and obviously the
lower courts, no option but to plod through each fact situation, case
by case, to determine the reasonableness of the delayed search.
The brightest line at which to require a warrant in a delayed
search of a package seized in the course of a valid automobile search
is at the point where obtaining a warrant becomes practicable. The
justifications in Ross allow the warrantless search of packages found
in the course of a valid automobile search if the police officer could
have reasonably believed that the package contained the object of
the search.98 However, if the police officer's intention is to seize the
packages, but the officer does not search them incident to the initial
search of the automobile, the Ross decision's practical concerns 99
are no longer valid; the search of the automobile will not be
delayed and the reasons for the automobile exception will not be
undermined. From that point on, the reasonableness of the search
should depend on the practicability of obtaining a warrant. 100
Since the reasons that underlie the exception to the warrant re-
quirement for the search of packages in Ross do not apply to pack-
ages held by officials after the automobile search has been
completed, the Court's decision to extend the Ross exception to the
facts in this case violates its historic refusal to extend exceptions to
the warrant clause beyond the reasons giving rise to them. 10 Ross
did not purport to treat packages in automobiles according to the
lesser expectation of privacy afforded to automobiles, but the
Court's application of Ross to the facts ofJohns makes the historically
protected expectation of privacy in packages no greater than that
of the automobile itself. This step was unprecendented and
unsupported.
Notwithstanding the above reasoning, the Johns Court justified
98 Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
99 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. In Johns, once the packages were se-
cured, any search of the trucks was over and could not have been impeded by requiring
a warrant for the search of the packages.
100 One complaint against this suggestion is that a standard which closely adheres to
the fourth amendment presumption in favor of warrants would unduly burden police
officers in the completion of their duties. However, it is well established that "the mere
fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disre-
gard of the Fourth Amendment." Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393. Justice Marshall noted, "Of
course, efficiency and promptness can never be substituted for due process and adher-
ence to the Constitution. Is not a dictatorship the most 'efficient' form of government?"
Ross, 456 U.S. at 842 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101 See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 104 S. Ct. 641 (1984). See also supra note 5.
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its extension of the Ross exception by comparing the three-day delay
in Johns to cases which permit a delayed warrantless search of an
automobile.' 0 2 This analogy cannot justify the delayed package
search in Johns, however, because of the historically different expec-
tations of privacy surrounding automobiles and packages.
Since the passage of the fourth amendment, automobiles (or
their functional predecessors) have not been protected by the war-
rant clause.' 03 In addition, since Carroll in 1925, the law has been
clear that one has little expectation of privacy in an automobile.' 0 4
This reasoning has allowed the Court to uphold the search of an
automobile hours (or even days) after its seizure even in the absence
of exigent circumstances.10 5
The same is not true of packages. 106 The Court has attributed a
greater expectation of privacy to the individual in cases involving
packages. 10 7 Thus, like any other areas or things protected by the
warrant clause, and unlike automobiles, the scope of any exception
that allows for a warrantless search of packages should be deline-
ated by the practicability of getting a warrant.108 The analogy of the
delay in Johns to the permissible delay in warrantless automobile
search cases is thus not a justification for the warrantless search of
packages.
The better analogies are to the search incident to arrest10 9 and
post-fire"O exceptions. These exceptions are based exclusively on
exigent circumstances and practical considerations, whereas the au-
tomobile exception is largely based on a lesser expectation of pri-
102 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
103 Ross, 456 U.S. at 807.
104 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153. "[The guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically from the begin-
ning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between the search of a
store, dwelling, house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant
readily may be obtained, and the search of a ship, boat, wagon or automobile for contra-
band goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because a vehicle can be
quickly moved from the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
105 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
106 Ross, 456 U.S. at 811-12; Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11.
107 ExparteJackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
108 In the Ross scenario where a package is found in the course of a valid, warrantless
automobile search and could reasonably contain the object of the search, obtaining a
warrant for the search of the package is impracticable. The warrantless search of the
package facilitates the automobile search and advances the practical considerations be-
hind the automobile exception. However, when the package is removed from the vehi-
cle and is secured by the police for three days, obtaining a warrant is clearly practicable.
109 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
110 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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vacy. 1 These exceptions are strictly limited by the courts to
circumstances where it is impractical for officials to obtain a warrant.
However, the Court in Johns failed to limit the Ross exception
similarly.
Furthermore, the practical consequences of not allowing the
delayed automobile search that the Court concerned itself with in
Chambers v. Maroney112 are not relevant with respect to packages. In
Chambers, the Court reasoned that to limit the warrantless search of
an automobile to the time contemporaneous with its seizure would
simply be impractical.' 1 3 Also, the Court rationalized that given the
initial intrusion caused by the seizure of the automobile, a contrary
rule would provide relatively minor additional protection for privacy
interests.114 With packages, however, the Court has repeatedly
stated that there is an important distinction between impounding a
package in anticipation of obtaining a warrant and the warrantless
search of the package."15 The warrant clause permits the former,
but prohibits the latter."
i 6
I 11 Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261-62 (holding that a vehicle lawfully in police
custody may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains con-
traband, even when there are no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search).
See also Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852 (1984)(per curiam).
112 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
113 In Chambers, the Court stated:
It was not unreasonable in this case to take the car to the station house. All occu-
pants in the car were arrested in a dark parking lot in the middle of the night. A
careful search at that point was impractical and perhaps not safe for the officers, and
it would serve the owner's convenience and the safety of his car to have the vehicle
and the keys together at the station house.
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52 n.10.
114 "[Tlhere is little to choose from in terms of practical consequences between an
immediate search without a warrant and the car's impoundment until a warrant is ob-
tained." Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52. The Court asserted that the intrusion of seizing the
vehicle in expectation of obtaining a warrant is equal to the intrusion of a warrantless
search of the automobile on the spot since the vehicle's occupants are stranded. Id.
115 United States v. Place 462 U.S. 696 (1983). See infra note 116. See also Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (officer properly seized the balloon
the driver attempted to hide when officer validly stopped automobile and saw loose
white powder and open bag of balloons); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654
(1980).
116 See Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984). In Segura, the Court recog-
nized that the police may, under certain circumstances, seize an item for the time neces-
sary in which to obtain a search warrant. Id. at 3387. The purpose of this seizure is to
give the police the opportunity to obtain a warrant. Id. Any seizure that is longer than
what is reasonably necessary to obtain a warrant, however, would be unreasonable. Id.
at 3391 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the police seized a suitcase on rea-
sonable suspicion in order to have a trained dog sniff the luggage for contraband. The
Court held that the 90-minute detention of the suitcase was unreasonable because it was
longer than necessary to have a dog smell the suitcase. Id. at 710.
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Finally, the Court's argument that Johns had no legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy because the packages were subject to a lawful
warrantless search at the airstrip again ignores the distinction be-
tween packages and automobiles, i.e., that packages are normally
protected by the warrant clause, and automobiles are not. Once it
became practicable to get a warrant, Johns regained a recognized
expectation of privacy. Certainly by the third day, Johns could legit-
imately expect that the packages would only be searched after re-
view by a magistrate since no exigent circumstances surrounded
them.
V. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Johns, the Supreme Court expanded the scope
of the Ross exception by holding that authorities could search pack-
ages without obtaining a warrant after holding the packages for
three days.1 17 The Court's extension of the Ross exception to the
delayed search of packages in Johns cannot be supported by either of
the Court's premises. First, the Ross exception should not apply be-
cause the practical considerations which justify the Ross exception
are not valid when the seized packages are the object of the search
and are secured by the police before the search is conducted. Sec-
ond, the Court incorrectly analogized the delay in this case to the
permissible delay between the warrantless seizure of an automobile
and its subsequent warrantless search. This analogy is inappropri-
ate because the Court has historically extended very different fourth
amendment protections to packages and automobiles.
The Court should have adhered to established fourth amend-
ment principles and recognized that exigent circumstances are the
sole justification for the warrantless search of a package. 118 This ex-
igency is present in the Ross scenario, where packages need to be
searched incident to the search of the automobile; it is absent when
packages have been secured by officials in a law enforcement ware-
house for three days. In this case, no impracticabilities precluded
police from obtaining a warrant to conduct the search, and the ad-
vantages of prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate far
outweigh the importance of the marginal inconvenience imposed on
the police. 19
InJohns, the Court had the opportunity to draw a bright line at
117 105 S. Ct. at 887.
118 Professor LaFave suggests that the Court consider the question of what constitutes
"truly exigent circumstances" for the purpose of avoiding the warrant requirement. 2
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 543 (1978).
119 See supra note 13.
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the point where obtaining a warrant becomes practicable. Instead
of seizing this opportunity, the Court further eroded fourth amend-
ment protections and showed little restraint in extending exceptions
to the strongly presumed warrant requirement.
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